1) I happen to agree with the axioms of math, when doing math however this is because I have decided that I agreed with them. The axiom that I am objecting to is the idea that the tool/actor and not cause is responsible for the consequences. I further object to any unjustified causal link between blaming and deserving blame. I feel both of these claims need support from logical arguments using baser premises.
"If many people across many different cultures agree on a moral rule, it can be said to be universal fairly reliably."
The agreement can be considered universal but that does not make the beliefs about Morality become moral truth by either Objective Morality or Ideal Observer theories. Beliefs do not create reality.
"Pets and children are not capable of higher forms of thinking that adult humans can do."
What aspect of higher thinking causes the ability to be responsible?
PS: Free to choose 1 option is not free. It is just another function called and run by the meat processor.
2) You were trying to persuade. I was describing my view. Persuading requires using premises shared by the audience, Describing requires using your own premises. The Tiger example is where I was trying to persuade instead of describe. As you can see I used my understanding of your premises to do so. Most of this discussion I have been inquiring for baser and baser premises behind your belief in a predetermined but moral reality to find what premises lead to my disagreement so we can discuss that. Alternatively you could try to build off premises I would share. If the axiomatic barrier is to resilient at this time we can leave it till later.
4) I am fairly sure you would not believe the Ideal Observer theory. It says that Morality only depends on a Hypothetical ideal observer. Hence Morality could exist without more than hypothetical observation. (please correct me if I am mistaken)
Why do I believe in Moral Realism? (note the steps are preferences)
Cognitivist: I have already covered this in my preference for the existence of Ought over the nonexistence of Ought.
Not Subjectivist: I find the idea that what was ought could change to ought not to be distasteful.
Not Error Theory: This is the moral/immoral preference over amoral.
1) Again, that was not something I was stating axiomatically (not sure why you're not getting this point). The specific rules themselves were supposed to be axiomatic, not the independence of morality from free will. As to how morality can exist without free will, my argument thus far has been that if you get to believe in free will without justification, I really shouldn't have to justify belief in morality without free will. I believe in an objective morality (independent from perception) based on shared human instincts. In order to better understand which beliefs are shared (and likely based on shared instincts) and which are peculiar, it is important to consider many people's beliefs across cultures. That is why I continue to use the popularity of a moral perspective as evidence of its validity. Relatedly, the fact that people are able to understand morality without believing in free will is evidence to me that belief in free will is superfluous to morality. Does that clear things up at all? I had to go over it more than once to express it clearly.
But let me try to explain how morality can exist without free will. Once you start thinking about how life can still have meaning without free will, it all starts to make more sense. Actually you would be surprised how similar our viewpoints are. The one sticking point is that you think that if a choice is inevitable then it isn't really a choice. I would agree with you that making choices is the most important thing, and the way that humans with our advanced frontal lobes can weigh consequences and make decisions is indeed what sets us apart. But I do think those choices are inevitable. A choice is made based on a subjective assessment of a situation, and for the choice to be different, the situation or the person would have to also be different. You can say that this view of people reduces them to meat processors, but it simply isn't true. True, they are not first causes any more than meat processors are, but that doesn't mean they aren't beautifully complex creatures capable of dramatically more than meat processors. I think you only say that because you arbitrarily choose to take a very negative view of existence without free will. I suppose I see the attractiveness of believing that things could've been different if we had made different choices, but it also seems absurd to me that such a thing could be possible.
4) I may not. It depends on what you mean. If hypothetical observation can exist independently from people to conceive of it, then you're right that I wouldn't believe this theory.
I find it strange that you choose to believe in moral realism out of convenience.
No more time for now
