is abortion correct when it saves the mother?

[OldTrees]

Letting Die
P1) More people are will die if we donate 10% rather than 20%.
2) If letting die is morally impermissible then donating 10% would be morally impermissible.
P3) Our moral intuitions find donating 10% to be permissible if not ideal.
4) Letting die must not be inherently impermissible.

Support
P1) If letting die is not impermissible, refusing to feed another begger is not impermissible.
P2) If it is not impermissible to refuse to feed another begger then it is permissible to prevent the begger from taking your food.
3) So preventing someone from taking of one's resources is permissible.

Abortion
P1) Cutting of involuntary taking of one's resources is not morally ideal but is morally permissible.
P2) Abortion is cutting of involuntary taking of one's resources.
3) Abortion is not morally ideal but is morally permissible.

I think I have gotten lost now on your current changes...could you please re post your argument with the changes?

I see your point on my argument, so what if I changed p1 to:

Killing innocent people doing involuntary actions is almost always impermissible? I don't know a better way to distinguish a bad person acting involuntary versus a good person unless I use the word 'innocent.' I still believe this premise needs 'almost' instead of just 'all' as you suggested since later in my argument I claimed the fetus does not meet a case where it is exempted from this definition. Because of that, I now can say fetus in particular would cause p1 to say: killing fetus' is always impermissible. If I say always right away, then I believe the statement becomes false.

1)
People are always doing involuntary actions. So "people doing involuntary actions" is logically equivalent with "people". Thus "Killing innocent people doing involuntary actions is almost always impermissible" is logically equivalent with "Killing innocent people is almost always impermissible".
2)
As you can see in the "0 is not 0" example. If your p1 includes an almost always rather than an always, then p1+p7=>p8 is invalid. Not necessarily wrong, merely invalid.

Donating. I mean...yeah, we could help more people by giving more money. Factors as I have suggested before included everyone doing their part. I argued before if everyone did their part we wouldn't have this issue and by finding out who didn't contribute, punish them.

I fail to see how the inaction of others justifies your inaction. Would you support this claim?

As far as letting die vs killing.

We can say that cutting off resources from involuntary taking is okay, which I believe is okay as well. The issue, such as the rich/poor example, if we know this stoppage will end up killing the person, we have a moral obligation to still try to help them. At the least, get them to a hospital or to someone who can look after them further.

-snip-

I am still not convinced we should have to donate though, even for others. I believe there is a responsibility issue with location issue. You see a man dying in front of your house, he's not your responsibility (you probably don't even know him), but since he is now in your location (at your steps), maybe that changes things. I feel like government and charity agencies also have a responsibility to do the hard work (maybe ask government for help) to keep all alive. If charities honestly need more money, they need to make it known, but if 10% is fine, it's now our fault if a lot of people die as long as we do 10%.

Here you introduce 2 theoretical moral obligations.
1) Removing support creates a moral obligation to find new support.
2) Responsibility based on physical proximity (man dying in front of your house) rather than effective proximity (men dying within reach of your money). [PS: Charities do make it known that they can do more good with more money.]

These claims of obligation would need support but they are also places that could attack my argument. #1 is more effective than #2 if supported.

One other issue: scam charities. Why not just say: I don't donate since I believe all charities are scams and thus not be responsible?

Reason to not say that: There is evidence to the contrary.

[northcity4]

Your depiction of my argument is flawed. You cannot say p1+p7--->p8 is invalid unless those were my only claims. Could you please show why it is invalid? What about p2-6?

If I were to change my p1 to just say innocent people, i would then argue the baby is innocent as well.

Then, abortion=killing of innocent person which = murder by definition. Since abortion is murder, it is therefore immoral? Maybe this is what you were trying to say?

Maybe like this?:
p1) Babies/fetuses are innocent people.
p2) Abortion is stopping resources to a fetus/baby.
p3) Stopping resources to a fetus/baby will kill it.
p4) Therefore, abortion is killing an innocent fetus/baby.
p5) Killing innocent fetus/babies is murder.
p6) Abortion is then therefore murder.
p7) Abortion is then therefore immoral.

Inaction:
We all want to live our lives.
p1) we know people are dying, like starving kids in Africa
p2) By everyone donating their part, we can help stop the starvation (I am actually going to claim this as a fact for right now)
p3) Kids are still starving in Africa
p4) Therefore, not everyone is doing their part.
p5) I donate my part every month=I have done my part.
Now this is where we need to look. Is the person in p5 responsible to up his part due to inactivity or should there be a punishment/auto take system against those who don't donate? Maybe do both?
I think that is where we should focus before I continue any further. Warrant: all charities are legit/doing their best with the money they get.

[OldTrees]

Your depiction of my argument is flawed. You cannot say p1+p7--->p8 is invalid unless those were my only claims. Could you please show why it is invalid? What about p2-6?

Your argument's logic uses 2-6 to conclude 7 and then uses 1+7 to conclude 8. That is the form you presented.
2-6 do a good job of supporting 7 with the exception of using 'killing' rather than 'letting die'.
p7) X is a Y
p1) Some Y are Z
p8) X is Z
Counterexample: (X,Y,Z) = (Zero,Number,Nonzero)
p7) 0 is a number
p1) Some numbers are nonzero
p8) 0 is nonzero

If I were to change my p1 to just say innocent people, i would then argue the baby is innocent as well.

Then, abortion=killing of innocent person which = murder by definition. Since abortion is murder, it is therefore immoral? Maybe this is what you were trying to say?

Abortion is letting die not killing. There is an difference between killing and letting die that has not been shown insignificant and has evidence to being significant.

Maybe like this?:
p1) Babies/fetuses are innocent people.
p2) Abortion is stopping resources to a fetus/baby.
p3) Stopping resources to a fetus/baby will kill it.
p4) Therefore, abortion is killing an innocent fetus/baby.
p5) Killing innocent fetus/babies is murder.
p6) Abortion is then therefore murder.
p7) Abortion is then therefore immoral.


p3 is inaccurate. "Stopping resources to a fetus/baby will let it die." is accurate. You will need to show that letting die is morally impermissible in this case.
p5 could be simplified to "Killing an innocent is murder." since you need that premise in there for good form.
However the form is good other than that 1 major and 1 minor details.


Inaction:
We all want to live our lives.
p1) we know people are dying, like starving kids in Africa
p2) By everyone donating their part, we can help stop the starvation (I am actually going to claim this as a fact for right now)
p3) Kids are still starving in Africa
p4) Therefore, not everyone is doing their part.
p5) I donate my part every month=I have done my part.
Now this is where we need to look. Is the person in p5 responsible to up his part due to inactivity or should there be a punishment/auto take system against those who don't donate? Maybe do both?
I think that is where we should focus before I continue any further. Warrant: all charities are legit/doing their best with the money they get.
p5 does not follow from p4. Either your part is total/potential donors or total/actual donors or another value independent on the total needed. You have not supported you assertion that your obligation is total/potential donors.

You are getting very good at using this form of presenting logic. I thank you for indulging me in this.

[northcity4]

You are welcome.

p3) Letting someone die is killing. It follows that you are refusing to save them. For sake of argument, I will stick to someone right near you as opposed to our donation example.

Someone is dying out front your door. You know he is dying and he asks for help. If you don't help him, you let him die, but you could have saved him. Since you let him die in this case, you are just as responsible for his death as the person (if someone/people did do anything before hand) who did this to him.

That is my support. --->on the basis of abortion, you know cutting off resources will kill the baby. The morality or permissiblity of cutting off resources is dependent upon if you know or not/ responsibility (like a degree/licence)

p5) No comment. I kept baby/fetus in there since I wanted to stay with that specific discussion.


In action. P5 was not meant to follow necessarily from p4. I was stating the position of a person do their part to see where the discussion may go from there. I am not too knowledgeable on total/potential donors or other values independent.

[OldTrees]

You are welcome.

p3) Letting someone die is killing. It follows that you are refusing to save them. For sake of argument, I will stick to someone right near you as opposed to our donation example.

Someone is dying out front your door. You know he is dying and he asks for help. If you don't help him, you let him die, but you could have saved him. Since you let him die in this case, you are just as responsible for his death as the person (if someone/people did do anything before hand) who did this to him.

That is my support. --->on the basis of abortion, you know cutting off resources will kill the baby. The morality or permissiblity of cutting off resources is dependent upon if you know or not/ responsibility (like a degree/licence)

Situation 1
Person A ties person B up and tosses them into the river. Person C is nearby.
Case 1: Person A fishes person B out of the water before person B drowns.
Case 2: Person C fishes person B out of the water before person B drowns.
Case 3: Person B drowns.

Situation 2
Everyone knows person B cannot swim. Person A pushes person B into the river. Person B drowns.

Situation 3
Everyone knows person B cannot swim. Person B trips into the river. Person C does not save Person B.

For letting person B die to have the same moral character as killing person B then
1) Our judgement of person A and person C in Situation 1 Case 3 must be identical.
2) Our judgement of person A in Situation 1 Case 1 and person C in Situation 1 Case 2 must be identical.
3) Our judgement of person A in Situation 2 and person C in Situation 3 must be identical.

In action. P5 was not meant to follow necessarily from p4. I was stating the position of a person do their part to see where the discussion may go from there. I am not too knowledgeable on total/potential donors or other values independent.

Your claim in P5 is dependent on a premise that the moral obligation is dependent on the number of potential donors rather than the number of actual donors or being independent of the number of donors.

[northcity4]

Letting die: Were you trying to make an inferential claim from your scenarios? For the most part, I agree with all your statements.

Obligation: I claimed that moral obligation is actually dependent upon the # of actual donors. I want to talk about this before I consider topics such as age, innocence, etc.

The charity World Hunger Association (WHA) says if everyone in place A donates 5$ a month, then they can help save millions of hungry children in Africa.
P1) Place A has one million people.
P2) According to WHA, if everyone one of those people donates 5$, they can save millions of hungry kids in Africa for one month.
P3) This means the organization needs five million dollars a month to save all these children.
After a consensus, it is agreed that place A will have everyone donate 5$ a month for WHA.
P5) WHA is receiving only 100,000 dollars a month which means only 20,000 people are donating 5$ a month out of a million.
P6) This means those same 20,000 people would have to donate an additional 245$ a month just to hit the five million dollar mark.
Now, you know you have been donating 5$ a month. Should you have to donate 49 times more cash on top of your monthly 5$ (50 times) to save all those children even if it means you will go broke quickly? Should I maybe donate a little more, but end up arguing that any deaths are the result of the other citizens? Do I have to donate more knowing I have done my part and just simply argue that those who didn't donate are therefore guilty?

This is what I meant.
Warrants: Everyone donates 5$ exactly or they donate none at all before the WHA makes it known about their income.

[OldTrees]

Letting die: Were you trying to make an inferential claim from your scenarios? For the most part, I agree with all your statements.

Yes. I was expecting us to share the intuition that while backing out of an attempted murder is not as bad as murder, it is morally inferior to saving someone.

Obligation: I claimed that moral obligation is actually dependent upon the # of actual donors. I want to talk about this before I consider topics such as age, innocence, etc.

The charity World Hunger Association (WHA) says if everyone in place A donates 5$ a month, then they can help save millions of hungry children in Africa.
P1) Place A has one million people.
P2) According to WHA, if everyone one of those people donates 5$, they can save millions of hungry kids in Africa for one month.
P3) This means the organization needs five million dollars a month to save all these children.
P4) After a consensus, it is agreed that place A will have everyone donate 5$ a month for WHA.
P5) WHA is receiving only 100,000 dollars a month which means only 20,000 people are donating 5$ a month out of a million.
P6) This means those same 20,000 people would have to donate an additional 245$ a month just to hit the five million dollar mark.
Now, you know you have been donating 5$ a month. Should you have to donate 49 times more cash on top of your monthly 5$ (50 times) to save all those children even if it means you will go broke quickly? Should I maybe donate a little more, but end up arguing that any deaths are the result of the other citizens? Do I have to donate more knowing I have done my part and just simply argue that those who didn't donate are therefore guilty?

This is what I meant.
Warrants: Everyone donates 5$ exactly or they donate none at all before the WHA makes it known about their income.

Uh.
1) That (P4) is not how donation works. It is very important to understand that donation is a voluntary and individual action.

2)
You are under the impression that there is a shared moral obligation to donate and that the size of that obligation is dependent on the number of people able to donate rather than the number of people that will donate. I will explain the difference below

P1) There is a cause that needs $5 Million per month to prevent 5 million from starving.
P2) There are 1 million people able to donate
P3) 20,000 people donate $5 per month
P4) $100,000 is raised saving 1 Million people but 4 Million starve.
If there was a moral obligation to donate then how much should one of the 20,000 have donated?
Answer 1: The moral obligation is to help prevent some death. $5 because the total cost / number of potential donors = $5.
Result: $100,000 is raised. 4 Million starve.
Answer 2: The moral obligation it to prevent people from dying. $250 because the total cost / number of actual donors = $250.
Result: $5 Million is raised. 0 Million starve.
The moral obligation definition used in answer 1 resulted in people starving. If accurate then letting people die must not be inherently impermissible.
The moral obligation definition used in answer 2 resulted in no starvation. It leaves open the possibility that letting people die could be inherently impermissible.

In short: If a moral theory considers the deficiency of donors to be more important than the lives of the starving, then that moral system sees nothing inherently impermissible about letting people die.

To tie this tangent back to where it came from: The criticism of my analogy (donation has other factors like non donors) grants the conclusion of my analogy (letting die is not inherently impermissible).

[northcity4]

Then, in abortion, would you say the mom is the only donor in this case and the only donor needed? Thus, should she not donate her resources (which cost is little), she is responsible for not saving the life?

I am still against the thinking though moms donate to their babies.

[OldTrees]

Then, in abortion, would you say the mom is the only donor in this case and the only donor needed? Thus, should she not donate her resources (which cost is little), she is responsible for not saving the life?

I am still against the thinking though moms donate to their babies.

Sidenote:
That depends on the development of the fetus and the development of medical technology.
In the past the mother was the only potential donor. (We are moving towards being able to manufacture alternatives)

To answer the question:
Yes, any mother that has an abortion is responsible for not saving the life of the fetus. Whether letting the fetus die is morally permissible or not is another question.

[northcity4]

(going back to your argument)

Let's assume moral theory allows deficiency of donors to allow permissiblity of people starving for a moment.

p1) WHA needs just 2 people to donate 1000$ to save a life and let's 1000 people know.
I donate 1000$
p2) The person is on the verge of death and needs one more donor since no one else has donated.

Outcome 1: I donate 1000$ as the last possible second for it to be used to save the persons life. Are the other 999 people guilty of almost letting the person die (assuming they knew all this time)?

Outcome 2: I don't donate, person dies. The other 999 people are guilty of letting the person die--->correct, but is this a case where letting die is permissible?

Outcome 3: Somone donates at the last second as well and saves the life. Are the 998 people left responsible for almost letting die?

Secondly, let's apply outcome 2 to world hunger. From previous arguments, it seems we are all guilty of letting people die. How would you go about explaining when letting die is permissible and not permissible? This is a political world and so that answer will usually involve how much we have to sacrifice versus the life would it not?


Assuming you know and refuse to do nothing about it, yet you have the time to easily:
p1) Letting someone die outside you door is impermissible.
p2) Letting someone die across the country is permissible if people over there already know about it.

I feel these premises seem fair as a starting point.

[OldTrees]

Outcome 1: Whether the 999 are guilty of letting someone die or not is dependent on whether intent or consequences is the relevant moral data.
Outcome 2: Yes the 999 are guilty.
Outcome 3: See outcome 1.

Secondly, let's apply outcome 2 to world hunger. From previous arguments, it seems we are all guilty of letting people die. How would you go about explaining when letting die is permissible and not permissible? This is a political world and so that answer will usually involve how much we have to sacrifice versus the life would it not?

Assuming you know and refuse to do nothing about it, yet you have the time to easily:
p1) Letting someone die outside you door is impermissible.
p2) Letting someone die across the country is permissible if people over there already know about it.

Here is where our moral intuitions probably differ:
I do not consider it morally impermissible to let someone die outside your door. I would not do so and would be deeply disappointed in anyone that did. However it is the disappointment at a lack of virtue not at a presence of vice.

[northcity4]

Outcome 1: Whether the 999 are guilty of letting someone die or not is dependent on whether intent or consequences is the relevant moral data.
Outcome 2: Yes the 999 are guilty.
Outcome 3: See outcome 1.

Secondly, let's apply outcome 2 to world hunger. From previous arguments, it seems we are all guilty of letting people die. How would you go about explaining when letting die is permissible and not permissible? This is a political world and so that answer will usually involve how much we have to sacrifice versus the life would it not?

Assuming you know and refuse to do nothing about it, yet you have the time to easily:
p1) Letting someone die outside you door is impermissible.
p2) Letting someone die across the country is permissible if people over there already know about it.

Here is where our moral intuitions probably differ:
I do not consider it morally impermissible to let someone die outside your door. I would not do so and would be deeply disappointed in anyone that did. However it is the disappointment at a lack of virtue not at a presence of vice.

I feel our intuitions are the same from what you've posted but well see.

Outcome 2: Want to go down the consequence route? We can look over direct consequences vs long term ones (sometime are slippery slope consequences).

In direct, it's the outcome directly after an event. In the event of letting someone dying outside your door unattended means they will die soon is direct consequence. You touch a hot stove, finger burns.

Long term: can philosophically justify something to be immoral if it meets the standards of a what in logic is called an inductive argument in that the events are likely to happen.

Example: failure to donate to a cause is not a direct result in people dying. There are of course other things that will happen that need to be looked at. I feel this is important because my moral intuitions tell me I cannot be immoral for not donating to something like world hunger or invisible children.