is abortion correct when it saves the mother?

[northcity4]

1) Name dropping was never a valid argument. Nor is showing a contradicting proof. To counter the violinist argument you must take issue with either the form or a premise of the argument. Then you must argue that you are right to take issue. However my goal was to inform not convince.

2) Review Positive right to life vs Negative right to life. Then consider the case of indefinite life support for the poor.

My problem with the violinist example is that you see you can save a person's life and choose not to do so. The violinist is not threatening your life, thus he is not being a negative right to life towards you.

Wow. You missed the argument by a hair.

The Violinist argument is that:
The violinist has a negative right to life. (Thus killing the violinist is immoral but letting the violinist die is permissible.)
Disconnecting the violinist is letting the violinist die.
Disconnecting the violinist is permissible.



A positive right to life implies that if you die everyone that could have prevented your death is guilty if immoral action. If people have a positive right to life then (give the capacity of today's life support) everyone is entitled to literally indefinite  life support. It is clearly impossible to provide unending life support for an exponentially growing pool of people. At some point there will be enough for 1 person but not enough for everyone. This point is when we can see the positive right to life contradicting itself. Hence why the right to life is assumed to be a negative right.

So, how do you counter the argument of 'do as much as you can?' You're right, we can't save everyone, nor can we make people immortal, but we can do as much as we can to keep them living. You can't defend the entire country sometimes, but is that reason not to defend what you can?

I get what you mean by the right to life being a negative right. I think you should also talk about knowing people in other countries are dying. Are we responsible if we don't help and could have helped? We can't travel everywhere at once, but by doing things by giving money, even a small amount, we can make a difference. So, are people who don't donate to causes like invisible children or other organizations that help dying or threatened people just as bad as the guy who let his friend die right in front of him?

The other fact you didn't answer was direct negative right to life. Actions must be direct for most cases of this topic. Philosophers do agree to something like this: if A has a negative right to B, B must refrain from killing A.

In the violinist example, letting the guy die is not a direct act of killing him, but the knowledge was directly known. This is why you cannot simply say it was permissible. When you bring up permissibility, remember that morality=actionxmotive.

If I was going to argue to let the violinist die, I would try to justify my motives at the time. What if making me wait in that room was stopping me from saving 2 human lives? Do i disconnect the violinist, let him die, and save the other two lives? Also, let's talk about human worth. You are connected to the best war commander ever instead of the violinist. The country needs him to save the country which has 1 billion people. If you stay to save him though, 2 lives in the other room will die. In fact, let's also talk about just 1 life in the other room will die, in fact this person is in a coma and has severe brain damage.

Human worth come to mind?

[OldTrees]

northcity.
I have already said I was done discussing this with you. I am willing to point out what topics or arguments you need to review. However I am not going to continue a discussion with a brick wall.

Based on your last post I would also recommend you review argumentation. To critique a philosophic argument you either claim  the form or the argument is invalid (with evidence) or that a premise is false (with an argument for the rejection of the premise.)

The Violinist argument has the form:
B -> C
A -> B
Therefore A -> C

The Violinist argument has 2 premises:
1) The violinist has a negative right to life.
2) Disconnecting the violinist is letting the violinist die.

Proper argumentation would critique the Violinist argument in one of these 3 ways:
1) Claim the form was invalid and provide a logic proof of the invalid logic.
2) Claim the violinist does not have a negative right to life and provide an argument to that effect.
3) Claim Disconnecting the violinist is killing the violinist and provide an argument to that effect.

[northcity4]

northcity.
I have already said I was done discussing this with you. I am willing to point out what topics or arguments you need to review. However I am not going to continue a discussion with a brick wall.

Based on your last post I would also recommend you review argumentation. To critique a philosophic argument you either claim  the form or the argument is invalid (with evidence) or that a premise is false (with an argument for the rejection of the premise.)

The Violinist argument has the form:
B -> C
A -> B
Therefore A -> C

The Violinist argument has 2 premises:
1) The violinist has a negative right to life.
2) Disconnecting the violinist is letting the violinist die.

Proper argumentation would critique the Violinist argument in one of these 3 ways:
1) Claim the form was invalid and provide a logic proof of the invalid logic.
2) Claim the violinist does not have a negative right to life and provide an argument to that effect.
3) Claim Disconnecting the violinist is killing the violinist and provide an argument to that effect.

No, you don't seem to get it. I have studied these areas thoroughly. It's you who needs a little bit of help.

1) Rights to life really don't matter unless they are direct.
2) If a motive is indirect, such as slipper slope fallacy for example, then we must look at other factors.
3) To direct knowledge is just as serious as directing killing someone. Let's take #3 about disconnecting for example: I already said he knew disconnecting would kill him. King David in the bible knew sending that one guy to the front lines of battle would get him killed. Knowing 9/11 was going to happen and failing to report it right away makes you just as bad. How many examples do you need?
4) Permissibility only gives more evidence to saving the violinist. To argue negative right to life is a selfish motive thus is immoral. How many times do I need to tell you that:

Morality=motivexaction. This is what is important. The action is letting the violinist die which in #3 is just as bad as direct murder for example. So, what kind of reason must the guy have to let the violinist die? Action=killing, therefore to be moral or not immoral motive must be good.

 The violinist argument if B -> C
A -> B
Therefore A -> C only explain what happened. Negative right to life does not matter due to #1 by definition. Letting the violinist die is the action it's morality dependent on the motive. Some examples as I stated were to save more lives and bring up a scenario regarding human worth.

[mesaprotector]

I'm not experienced with this topic and have never taken a class in ethics, so take anything I say with a grain of salt.

When it comes to the violinist question, I would argue that the actor is not who it appears to be. The violinist, initially, had a positive right to live. Then some third party enlisted me, by proxy, to not let the violinist die (fulfilling a positive duty). Since I was not the one who made this decision, I would say that it's roughly equivalent to the trolley argument's fat man variation, with me being the fat man. I have no moral duty to stay connected.

[OldTrees]

I'm not experienced with this topic and have never taken a class in ethics, so take anything I say with a grain of salt.

When it comes to the violinist question, I would argue that the actor is not who it appears to be. The violinist, initially, had a positive right to live. Then some third party enlisted me, by proxy, to not let the violinist die (fulfilling a positive duty). Since I was not the one who made this decision, I would say that it's roughly equivalent to the trolley argument's fat man variation, with me being the fat man. I have no moral duty to stay connected.

Interesting take. The violinist argument usually merely assumes a negative right to life.

A positive right is a positive duty that falls on all that are capable of satisfying it until it is fulfilled. So you and the fat man would both share in the positive duty after you have been enabled to satisfy the positive duty.

Situation: I am providing for a positive right. I stop providing for that right. Someone else steps in and provides for that right. Was my action impermissible or merely not morally ideal?

[northcity4]

I'm not experienced with this topic and have never taken a class in ethics, so take anything I say with a grain of salt.

When it comes to the violinist question, I would argue that the actor is not who it appears to be. The violinist, initially, had a positive right to live. Then some third party enlisted me, by proxy, to not let the violinist die (fulfilling a positive duty). Since I was not the one who made this decision, I would say that it's roughly equivalent to the trolley argument's fat man variation, with me being the fat man. I have no moral duty to stay connected.

Interesting take. The violinist argument usually merely assumes a negative right to life.

A positive right is a positive duty that falls on all that are capable of satisfying it until it is fulfilled. So you and the fat man would both share in the positive duty after you have been enabled to satisfy the positive duty.

Situation: I am providing for a positive right. I stop providing for that right. Someone else steps in and provides for that right. Was my action impermissible or merely not morally ideal?

No, your action is permissible. Motive again is selfish, but, and I emphasize 'but,' your action is no longer letting the violinist die. I am reading someone else comes in to take over as the 'connected guy' correct?

Why permissible? Motive may be selfish, but your act is now no longer a duty to the person. To say it's not permissible is like saying it's wrong to make money because your selfish. Although that may be true, your acts have no negative/positive rights against someone else s.

[northcity4]

OT, I am still pushing to ask about the human worth topic.

[OldTrees]

OT, I am still pushing to ask about the human worth topic.

I have already answered that humans that have moral worth do not have moral worth merely because they are human. That is my final answer.

[northcity4]

OT, I am still pushing to ask about the human worth topic.

I have already answered that humans that have moral worth do not have moral worth merely because they are human. That is my final answer.

Didn't mean that. I meant from the violinist example. Let's assume you were connected to a general who could save millions if kept alive, but would cost the life of someone in the other room. It makes sense to save the general (like in a war time effort), but is the situation of the war enough to make him more valuable? I am not talking about his contribution to society.

In the same way, if the mom is the general in this thread, can she honestly justify killing the baby to keep herself alive assuming there are no other roads to take?

I'm not experienced with this topic and have never taken a class in ethics, so take anything I say with a grain of salt.

When it comes to the violinist question, I would argue that the actor is not who it appears to be. The violinist, initially, had a positive right to live. Then some third party enlisted me, by proxy, to not let the violinist die (fulfilling a positive duty). Since I was not the one who made this decision, I would say that it's roughly equivalent to the trolley argument's fat man variation, with me being the fat man. I have no moral duty to stay connected.

Interesting take. The violinist argument usually merely assumes a negative right to life.

A positive right is a positive duty that falls on all that are capable of satisfying it until it is fulfilled. So you and the fat man would both share in the positive duty after you have been enabled to satisfy the positive duty.

Situation: I am providing for a positive right. I stop providing for that right. Someone else steps in and provides for that right. Was my action impermissible or merely not morally ideal?

No, your action is permissible. Motive again is selfish, but, and I emphasize 'but,' your action is no longer letting the violinist die. I am reading someone else comes in to take over as the 'connected guy' correct?

Why permissible? Motive may be selfish, but your act is now no longer a duty to the person. To say it's not permissible is like saying it's wrong to make money because your selfish. Although that may be true, your acts have no negative/positive rights against someone else s.

Lastly, your thoughts on this.

[OldTrees]

OT, I am still pushing to ask about the human worth topic.

I have already answered that humans that have moral worth do not have moral worth merely because they are human. That is my final answer.

Didn't mean that. I meant from the violinist example. Let's assume you were connected to a general who could save millions if kept alive, but would cost the life of someone in the other room. It makes sense to save the general (like in a war time effort), but is the situation of the war enough to make him more valuable? I am not talking about his contribution to society.

In the same way, if the mom is the general in this thread, can she honestly justify killing the baby to keep herself alive assuming there are no other roads to take?

I was not making the violinist argument. I was informing you of it. I do not see any evidence in the author's works that they would consider the possibility that one moral person might have more rights than another. You certainly do not see use of the word "value" since that is consequentialism not deontology.

I'm not experienced with this topic and have never taken a class in ethics, so take anything I say with a grain of salt.

When it comes to the violinist question, I would argue that the actor is not who it appears to be. The violinist, initially, had a positive right to live. Then some third party enlisted me, by proxy, to not let the violinist die (fulfilling a positive duty). Since I was not the one who made this decision, I would say that it's roughly equivalent to the trolley argument's fat man variation, with me being the fat man. I have no moral duty to stay connected.

Interesting take. The violinist argument usually merely assumes a negative right to life.

A positive right is a positive duty that falls on all that are capable of satisfying it until it is fulfilled. So you and the fat man would both share in the positive duty after you have been enabled to satisfy the positive duty.

Situation: I am providing for a positive right. I stop providing for that right. Someone else steps in and provides for that right. Was my action impermissible or merely not morally ideal?

No, your action is permissible. Motive again is selfish, but, and I emphasize 'but,' your action is no longer letting the violinist die. I am reading someone else comes in to take over as the 'connected guy' correct?

Why permissible? Motive may be selfish, but your act is now no longer a duty to the person. To say it's not permissible is like saying it's wrong to make money because your selfish. Although that may be true, your acts have no negative/positive rights against someone else s.

Lastly, your thoughts on this.

If you are saying:
"Right based ethics only care about the action being done not who did the action. Your decision could have but did not result in the right being violated."
Then
I accept the form and would have to think about that first premise. I initially agree with it which means I need to examine it more closely than if I did not agree with it.

[northcity4]

[[[I was not making the violinist argument. I was informing you of it. I do not see any evidence in the author's works that they would consider the possibility that one moral person might have more rights than another. You certainly do not see use of the word "value" since that is consequentialism not deontology.]]]

Some people such as T.M. Scanlon beg to differ and say the two need each other. If you refuse to answer my questions in regards to consequences I cannot continue talking with you on this subject as it will only put a block in the road for 'is abortion correct when it saves the mother?'

I am not here to specifically go over philosophical ideas and move over one to the next. If we are going to talk about this thread, we must combine philosophical ideas. Called critical thinking for a reason.

So I will ask again: In the same way, if the mom is the general in this thread, can she honestly justify killing the baby to keep herself alive to save others assuming there are no other roads to take?

My take is consequences do not matter since situations do not override the morality of the problem.

Here is my answer to the question: a man unknowingly is pressing this red button for fun. Each time he does, someone dies randomly. The ONLY way to make him stop is by killing him. Can you justify killing him? Yes. In order to save many, you had to kill one, even though this man was innocent.

Now, although it's not the baby's fault the mom is dying, she can justify her motive by saying I am killing you to save others, not because I care about being alive over you baby. Although, some people still feel this is immoral still.

[OldTrees]

Combining two conflicting normative theories or even two conflicting premises in sequence is foolishness.
Evaluating the situation from multiple consistent theories is wise.
Ex: Evaluating an event that happened at either Noon or Midnight could be done by:
1) Evaluating it at the fictional Noonight or
2) Evaluating it at Noon and then evaluating it at Midnight.


When you ask about a situation we can identify data an separate out what each theory would consider morally significant. If we ask one theory about data it considers morally insignificant then we should expect it to treat the data as insignificant.