for and against free will

[ZergKing]

Free Will does not exist and will never exist. Even now my body is doing something i am not really sure i want to do and cannot really stop without exerting horrendous mental effort. I feel like an observer in my body watching the day unfold in front of my eyes and feeling what my body is telling me but not really controlling it. I can just tune out for short period of times while my body does everything like usual. It is a really freaky thing to say this but the whole topic of free will is confusing. Now don't think i am some nut case for saying what i say and making it feel like a paradox but it seems that the world feels distant and that i am not actually in control of my body but giving subtle hints to it. Humans don't have free will and never will have free will. It is actually the mind that has the free will, but no physical embodiment to use this and instead hints to the human it controls to do things. This is shown whenever anyone does something that they would never actually do.

I too occasionally experience something close to this. However, luckily, most of those times it feels like I am arguing with the body not hinting at it. I have control to demonstrate my mind's Free Will but that control is limited.
(See addictions for harsher examples)

@Neopergoss
MetaE: This thread and the most recent long discussion in the Problem of Pain thread.
NormE: I am insecure and secure at the same time.
I doubt my current moral convictions but I doubt the other theories too.
I doubt if I will ever belief the same as the true moral code but I know I am giving it much better than most.
Applied: Correct. See all my posts in the Politics subforum.

It is good to know that i am not the only one feeling this it is a rather weird feeling but still it helps my studies of it

[OldTrees]

Ok I see

The correlation between norms and the true moral code fluctuates drastically inside and between cultures (across time or space).

How would you know? You claim to be as ignorant as the rest of us of the true moral code, so how can you be making correlations?

The descriptive theory of Cultural Relativism. The correlation between B and the set of (A, !A) fluctuates based on which member of the set is being referenced.

Why would knowledge of this consensus of fluctuating validity be useful as a standard for moral competency?

Because we each live in a particular society. Because we are not disembodied intellects. Because we can't wait for a true moral code that will probably never be discovered. We have to have rules to live with each other. You accept the rules of this forum in order to participate. You accept many sets of rules, at least passively, and you benefit from them, however contemptuous you may be of all rules.

As for moral competence, our standards have to be based on the norms we are using. Ought implies can. If we expect people to know certain things, that set of required knowledge should be knowable and easily accessible, not some unknown "true moral code."

However applying culpable ignorance to knowledge of norms seems to excuse the actions but not the agency (note ignorance can be culpable in children) of the feral.

If the feral human has no understanding of right and wrong, then he/she isn't a moral agent. I assume that feral humans can achieve some limited understanding of norms, in the same way that pet dogs and cats can have a limited understanding of the relevant household rules. However, it's unlikely that they will ever be morally competent at the level expected of normal adult humans.

So you are proposing using knowledge of social norms as a very rough estimate of Moral Competency (you are defining as: understanding of right and wrong)?
Would not understanding of right and wrong (understanding not knowledge because we both agree knowing the true moral code is not likely/possible) via the ability to use logic and imagining the concept of Ought be a sufficient more general measurement of Moral Competency?

[Belthus]

The descriptive theory of Cultural Relativism. The correlation between B and the set of (A, !A) fluctuates based on which member of the set is being referenced.

Suppose the true moral code is like the principles of architecture. The principles of architecture do not provide a unique answer as to what kind of house you should build. A multitude of house designs can satisfy relevant criteria (e.g., long-lasting, energy efficient, fits in with neighboring houses, easy to maintain, etc.). A naive observer, seeing so many different houses, thinks that surely 99.9% of these houses are defective, and there can be only one truly good house design. The naive observer thinks that once that truly good house design is found, all right-thinking people will build only that one kind of house.

So you are proposing using knowledge of social norms as a very rough estimate of Moral Competency (you are defining as: understanding of right and wrong)?

I am "proposing" what already exists. Legal systems do not expect philosophizing. They expect people to know what the laws are. Those who break laws yet are fundamentally unable to understand laws (e.g., young children, the retarded, the insane) are treated less harshly, though such people also have fewer rights.

Would not understanding of right and wrong (understanding not knowledge because we both agree knowing the true moral code is not likely/possible) via the ability to use logic and imagining the concept of Ought be a sufficient more general measurement of Moral Competency?

How would you implement such a standard in a modern legal system? Whose status would be changed? Can you point to societies that use such a standard of moral competence?

[OldTrees]

The descriptive theory of Cultural Relativism. The correlation between B and the set of (A, !A) fluctuates based on which member of the set is being referenced.

Suppose the true moral code is like the principles of architecture. The principles of architecture do not provide a unique answer as to what kind of house you should build. A multitude of house designs can satisfy relevant criteria (e.g., long-lasting, energy efficient, fits in with neighboring houses, easy to maintain, etc.). A naive observer, seeing so many different houses, thinks that surely 99.9% of these houses are defective, and there can be only one truly good house design. The naive observer thinks that once that truly good house design is found, all right-thinking people will build only that one kind of house.

There are cultural norms that directly contradict and claim the other is immoral.
Architects do not claim their style is the only right way to do it rather they claim the principles of architecture are right and that code is loose enough to have all those styles be permissible.

So you are proposing using knowledge of social norms as a very rough estimate of Moral Competency (you are defining as: understanding of right and wrong)?

I am "proposing" what already exists. Legal systems do not expect philosophizing. They expect people to know what the laws are. Those who break laws yet are fundamentally unable to understand laws (e.g., young children, the retarded, the insane) are treated less harshly, though such people also have fewer rights.

Ignorance of a law is no excuse in the US though inability to understand a law is an excuse in the US. This is how the US regards Legal Competency. If we assume the same logic is true for Moral Competency then incorrect beliefs would not be Moral Incompetence but inability to understand morality would be Moral Incompetence.

Would not understanding of right and wrong (understanding not knowledge because we both agree knowing the true moral code is not likely/possible) via the ability to use logic and imagining the concept of Ought be a sufficient more general measurement of Moral Competency?

How would you implement such a standard in a modern legal system? Whose status would be changed? Can you point to societies that use such a standard of moral competence?

I see no reason to legislate Morality.

[Belthus]

There are cultural norms that directly contradict and claim the other is immoral.
Architects do not claim their style is the only right way to do it rather they claim the principles of architecture are right and that code is loose enough to have all those styles be permissible.

It's possible for a culture's meta-ethics claim that its norms are exclusively correct to be wrong, and yet its norms could be one of many correct systems. If Frank Lloyd Wright had claimed that his buildings were the only good buildings, that claim could be rejected without denying that his buildings (along with many others) are good. That seems to be a common situation in applied sciences — more than one solution is possible.

Ignorance of a law is no excuse in the US though inability to understand a law is an excuse in the US. This is how the US regards Legal Competency. If we assume the same logic is true for Moral Competency then incorrect beliefs would not be Moral Incompetence but inability to understand morality would be Moral Incompetence.

You must be allergic to anything social. Unfortunately, morality is social through and through, to its very core. Society precedes individual conscience. The individual can only develop as a complete human being with the support and guidance of other humans. Social norms are a necessary starting point for practical morality. Social norms can and do change, as people experience problems with the existing system.

I don't consider legal competence and moral competence to be parallel systems. I consider legal competence to be a minimum for a normal adult human. People can and do exceed that minimum by noticing problems in the laws and reforming (or occasionally even overthrowing) them.

Rationality is important, but more important, in my view, is empathy. When people are only motivated by their narrowest interests, they multiply conflicts and commit atrocities. When people have concern for others as well as themselves, they are motivated to make arrangements that benefit everyone.

I see no reason to legislate Morality.

Can you point to anything as an example of how people can live without laws (or only with laws that have zero moral content)?

[OldTrees]

There are cultural norms that directly contradict and claim the other is immoral.
Architects do not claim their style is the only right way to do it rather they claim the principles of architecture are right and that code is loose enough to have all those styles be permissible.

It's possible for a culture's meta-ethics claim that its norms are exclusively correct to be wrong, and yet its norms could be one of many correct systems. If Frank Lloyd Wright had claimed that his buildings were the only good buildings, that claim could be rejected without denying that his buildings (along with many others) are good. That seems to be a common situation in applied sciences — more than one solution is possible.

I was not referring to a meta-ethical claim. I was referring to ethical claims like "such and such a lifestyle is morally impermissible" contradicting another culture's ethical claim "said lifestyle is morally permissible". (Sexuality is a decent example of such A & !A examples across cultures)
If we ignore these contradictions and only use the societal norms that conform to a universal consensus then the correlation would be a single value (although unknown) and not fluctuate except across time.

I am "proposing" what already exists. Legal systems do not expect philosophizing. They expect people to know what the laws are. Those who break laws yet are fundamentally unable to understand laws (e.g., young children, the retarded, the insane) are treated less harshly, though such people also have fewer rights.

Ignorance of a law is no excuse in the US though inability to understand a law is an excuse in the US. This is how the US regards Legal Competency. If we assume the same logic is true for Moral Competency then incorrect beliefs would not be Moral Incompetence but inability to understand morality would be Moral Incompetence.

You must be allergic to anything social. Unfortunately, morality is social through and through, to its very core. Society precedes individual conscience. The individual can only develop as a complete human being with the support and guidance of other humans. Social norms are a necessary starting point for practical morality. Social norms can and do change, as people experience problems with the existing system.

I don't consider legal competence and moral competence to be parallel systems. I consider legal competence to be a minimum for a normal adult human. People can and do exceed that minimum by noticing problems in the laws and reforming (or occasionally even overthrowing) them.

Rationality is important, but more important, in my view, is empathy. When people are only motivated by their narrowest interests, they multiply conflicts and commit atrocities. When people have concern for others as well as themselves, they are motivated to make arrangements that benefit everyone.

You commented on legality. I added on to your comment and tried (as I assume you were doing) to apply the pattern to moral competence.

I agree that Empathy is important. However I would make a normative claim and not a meta-ethical claim to that effect. (I assume we are mostly discussing meta-ethics at this point)

I see no reason to legislate Morality.

Can you point to anything as an example of how people can live without laws (or only with laws that have zero moral content)?

Easy.
1) Do not use Normative claims as justification for legislation
2) Use descriptive claims and general preferences to justify legislation
Ex: Most people prefer to live in a society where they do not need to fear being killed without their consent. Most people are willing to trade being able to kill others without their consent to live in such a society. Therefore a society made of just those people should legislate killing without consent to be illegal in order to not need to fear being killed without consent.

[Uppercut]

Can you point to anything as an example of how people can live without laws (or only with laws that have zero moral content)?

Morality is merely a belief, therefor a law is only as moral as you believe it to be. It could be concluded that all laws have 0 moral content from certain perspectives.

[Belthus]

I was not referring to a meta-ethical claim. I was referring to ethical claims like "such and such a lifestyle is morally impermissible" contradicting another culture's ethical claim "said lifestyle is morally permissible". (Sexuality is a decent example of such A & !A examples across cultures)

A and !A both can plausibly be parts of different functional and sustainable societies. Practical criteria can make superficial contradictions irrelevant (as in the architecture example). That's not to say that all differences across societies are irrelevant, but you would actually have to specify the moral criteria before you know whether a difference is trivial or substantial.

I agree that Empathy is important. However I would make a normative claim and not a meta-ethical claim to that effect. (I assume we are mostly discussing meta-ethics at this point)

I consider empathy to be a normal (but not inevitable) part of human development. It's a built-in potential, but it has to be activated by a supportive environment.

Easy.
1) Do not use Normative claims as justification for legislation
2) Use descriptive claims and general preferences to justify legislation
Ex: Most people prefer to live in a society where they do not need to fear being killed without their consent. Most people are willing to trade being able to kill others without their consent to live in such a society. Therefore a society made of just those people should legislate killing without consent to be illegal in order to not need to fear being killed without consent.

I think I agree with most of what you wrote above, but I am not sure what the phrase "just those people" means. Are you saying that the Mafia, for example, could opt out of the legal system? They prefer their own arrangements, which have more freedom to kill, steal, etc., together with the increased risks. Or do you accept that a polity as a whole can outlaw murder, despite the minority Mafia's objection, and still enforce that law on the Mafia?

[OldTrees]

I was not referring to a meta-ethical claim. I was referring to ethical claims like "such and such a lifestyle is morally impermissible" contradicting another culture's ethical claim "said lifestyle is morally permissible". (Sexuality is a decent example of such A & !A examples across cultures)

A and !A both can plausibly be parts of different functional and sustainable societies. Practical criteria can make superficial contradictions irrelevant (as in the architecture example). That's not to say that all differences across societies are irrelevant, but you would actually have to specify the moral criteria before you know whether a difference is trivial or substantial.

A: Homosexuality is morally permissible.
!A: Homosexuality is morally impermissible.
B: Heterosexuality is morally permissible.
!B: Heterosexuality is morally impermissible.
(A or !A) is compatible with (B or !B) however A as a normative claim is not compatible with !A as a normative claim. [Law of the excluded middle]

I agree that Empathy is important. However I would make a normative claim and not a meta-ethical claim to that effect. (I assume we are mostly discussing meta-ethics at this point)

I consider empathy to be a normal (but not inevitable) part of human development. It's a built-in potential, but it has to be activated by a supportive environment.

However the claim that it is relevant to questions of Ought is a normative claim. Built in potential does not inherently mean relevant without assuming a prior normative claim.

Easy.
1) Do not use Normative claims as justification for legislation
2) Use descriptive claims and general preferences to justify legislation
Ex: Most people prefer to live in a society where they do not need to fear being killed without their consent. Most people are willing to trade being able to kill others without their consent to live in such a society. Therefore a society made of just those people should legislate killing without consent to be illegal in order to not need to fear being killed without consent.

I think I agree with most of what you wrote above, but I am not sure what the phrase "just those people" means. Are you saying that the Mafia, for example, could opt out of the legal system? They prefer their own arrangements, which have more freedom to kill, steal, etc., together with the increased risks. Or do you accept that a polity as a whole can outlaw murder, despite the minority Mafia's objection, and still enforce that law on the Mafia?

The Mafia (people who do not want to live in a society that prohibits non consensual killing) should not live in the society as "those people" (who do want to prohibit non consensual killing) if they (both sides) do not want political conflict. This typically would entail two territories that defend their borders. If territory is limited, shrink the defined size of society until it is possible.

[Uppercut]

The Mafia (people who do not want to live in a society that prohibits non consensual killing) should not live in the society as "those people" (who do want to prohibit non consensual killing) if they (both sides) do not want political conflict. This typically would entail two territories that defend their borders. If territory is limited, shrink the defined size of society until it is possible.

No, wrong. Normative does not mean rationally derived, normative does not mean it should remain within its own borders. This suggestion is really awful and as akin to saying "Those socialist liberals should go to Norway and leave us racist redneck conservative Americans alone.". This is a weird thing to grasp since a lot of behavioral sciences are based on comparing people to their cultural norms and normative behaviors, but normal and sane are far from synonymous.

[OldTrees]

The Mafia (people who do not want to live in a society that prohibits non consensual killing) should not live in the society as "those people" (who do want to prohibit non consensual killing) if they (both sides) do not want political conflict. This typically would entail two territories that defend their borders. If territory is limited, shrink the defined size of society until it is possible.

No, wrong. Normative does not mean rationally derived, normative does not mean it should remain within its own borders. This suggestion is really awful and as akin to saying "Those socialist liberals should go to Norway and leave us racist redneck conservative Americans alone.". This is a weird thing to grasp since a lot of behavioral sciences are based on comparing people to their cultural norms and normative behaviors, but normal and sane are far from synonymous.

1) People making normative claims are not necessarily rational. However I was pointing out that Normative claims based on societal norms could and sometimes do contradict each other.
2) I was not suggesting exiling. I was suggesting neither side be subjugated but laws that they cannot agree with. What I was suggesting was the socialists  and conservatives in parallel streets run their streets as socialist and conservative and not impose their agenda on the other by force (political or otherwise). I further added a clause that this should be done on a house by house basis for mixed streets...

[Belthus]

A: Homosexuality is morally permissible.
!A: Homosexuality is morally impermissible.
B: Heterosexuality is morally permissible.
!B: Heterosexuality is morally impermissible.
(A or !A) is compatible with (B or !B) however A as a normative claim is not compatible with !A as a normative claim. [Law of the excluded middle]

Without knowing the criteria for true morality, we cannot say whether a difference in norms between different societies is (1) evidence of error by at least one society, or (2) a trivial difference like the different colors of the interior walls of houses. The criteria I have specified (functionality and sustainability) allow me to pass meta-ethical judgment, but you don't accept my criteria.

However the claim that it is relevant to questions of Ought is a normative claim. Built in potential does not inherently mean relevant without assuming a prior normative claim.

I say that it is an empirical issue. Do people with empathy behave more morally than people without empathy? Do people behave more morally when their empathy is evoked than when their antipathy is evoked?

Much of human behavior can be explained as a joint function of motivation and ability. Our discussion of moral competence touches on one aspect of the ability to make moral decisions. Empathy has a role in the motivation of morality. When news of a child in danger is broadcast, people all around the world are emotionally affected, hope for the best, and support the efforts made to save the child. A catastrophe elicits worldwide charitable donations for relief aid. Something that makes people care about those whom they have never met, and in many cases are very different, is a powerful force.